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Abstract

Sonti, Niharika. M.S.Egr., Department of Electrical Engineering, Wright State
University, 2010.
A Unified Method for Detecting and Isolating Process Faults and Sensor Faults in
Nonlinear Systems

With the increase in the complexity of control systems design and the demand for more
productivity, the possibility of the occurrence of faults in control systems has also
significantly increased. In this thesis, a unified method for the fault diagnosis of sensor
faults and process faults is developed for a class of Lipschitz nonlinear uncertain systems.
The fault detection and isolation (FDI) architecture is comprised of a fault detection
estimator and a bank of fault isolation estimators (FIEs), where each FIE is designed,
based on the functional structure of a particular fault, in the fault class under
consideration. The output residuals are generated, and adaptive thresholds are designed
for the detection and isolation of the faults. The effectiveness of the fault detection and
isolation algorithm is illustrated by a simulation example of single-link robotic arm.
Extensive simulation studies have been conducted using Matlab/Simulink. Based on the
nature of the residuals and their corresponding adaptive thresholds, the faults under
consideration are successfully detected and isolated.

Advisor: Dr. Zhang
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1.

Introduction

1.1 Fault Diagnosis
Any modern control system can be considered as a technical process. Each process is
designed to produce a certain desired output or perform a certain desired function.
However, ideal behavior may not always be exhibited by a system during its service life;
some of the system components may degrade, which leads to variation from its normal
behavior. These variations or anomalies, lead to undesirable effects in the system, often
resulting in inaccurate outputs or even catastrophic effects. The causes for these
anomalies in the functioning of a system, as a result of the degradation of system
components, are termed as ‘faults’ as shown in Fig. 1 [30]. Fault diagnosis is very
essential to ensure the reliable and smooth operation of modern control systems.

Figure 1: System performance affected by faults [30]
1

The block diagram of a typical control system, shown in Fig. 2, illustrates that a control
system can be divided into three parts – the actuators, the process and the sensors.
Therefore, depending on which system component is affected, the faults affecting the
system can also be classified as [1, 2, 4, 14, 30] –


Actuator faults – These kinds of faults are generally caused when the actuator in
the system starts to function improperly.



Process faults – These kinds of faults are caused when the existing relation
between the inputs and outputs is altered due to changes in the system.



Sensors faults – These kinds of faults are caused due to the errors in the
measurement of the outputs of the system.

Actuator faults

Process faults

Input

Output
Actuators

Controller

Process Dynamics

Sensor faults

Sensors

Figure 2: Fault diagnosis and control loop

The block diagram shown in Fig. 2 can be understood by considering a two tank system
as shown in Fig. 3 [40].
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Figure 3: Two Tank system [40]

In the two tank system shown in the figure above [40], water is pumped into the tank 1
through the pump P. The pump P is provided with an override to prevent the tank 1 from
overflowing. The rate at which water flows into tank 1 is qP. There is a leakage in tank 1
that is represented by qL. The water level in tank 1 is measured by the sensor h1. The
tank 1 is connected to tank 2. In between the two tanks, there are two valves, Va and V12.
The level of water in the two tanks is controlled by the valve V12. Under normal
conditions the auxiliary valve Va is closed. In order to open the auxiliary valve Va, the
valve V12 has to be closed. The rate at which water flows out of tank 2 is q2. The level of
water in tank 2 is measured by the sensor h2.

There are three types of faults that can occur in this system. Then the possible faults that
can occur in this two tank system can be grouped in the following manner –
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Actuator faults – As mentioned previously, Actuator faults are generally caused
when the actuators in the system start to function improperly. In the above two
tank example, an actuator fault may be caused by the improper functioning of the
pump [40].



Process faults – When certain changes occur in the system, the dynamic relation
between the input and output is also altered. Then, the existing relation between
the inputs and the outputs no longer hold, which leads to the occurrence of
process faults. For instance, in the two tank system detailed above [40], when
there is a leakage in tank 1 or when there is a blockage in the valve V12 , the
equations describing the system dynamics have to be changed, to take into
account the effect of the leakage and the blockage on the levels of water in the
two tanks.



Sensors faults – Sensor faults are caused due to the corrupted sensor measurement
of the outputs of the system. In the two tank system example given above [17,
40], sensor faults are caused when there is bias in the measurement of the sensors
h1 and h2.

As the design of modern control systems becomes more complex, the possibility of the
occurrence of faults in the system also increases. In order to improve the efficiency and
the performance of a system, a suitable system component must be designed, to monitor
the system for the occurrence of faults. The process, of identifying the presence of a fault
and its location and parameters, is termed as ‘fault diagnosis’. The procedure of fault
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diagnosis involves – fault detection, fault isolation, and fault identification [11, 30, 39,
38, 37].


Fault Detection
The first step in fault diagnosis is to determine whether a fault has occurred in the
system or not.



Fault Isolation
After it has been determined that a fault has occurred in the system, the next step
is to find out the location of the fault.



Fault Identification
The next step after fault isolation is to estimate the fault magnitude of the fault
that has occurred in the system.

1.2 Fault Diagnosis Methods
There are different methods of fault diagnosis, such as observer-based methods [11, 13,
30], parameter estimation [7, 13, 30] and neural networks approach [1, 2, 30] etc. These
methods can be broadly classified into two categories – model-based and model-free
methods.

1.2.1 Model-Based Methods:
The model-based methods of fault diagnosis involve the comparison of the system output
obtained from measurements, with the output information obtained from the
5

mathematical model of the system under the same conditions. The difference between the
actual and estimated outputs is termed as ‘residual’. The residual is then analyzed to
determine the nature and the type of the fault leading to fault isolation.

Figure 4: The procedure of residual generation

More specifically, model-based fault diagnosis methods consist of the following
components (as shown in the Fig. 4)


Generation of Residual – In this stage, a residual is generated to determine
whether or not a fault has occurred. Under ideal conditions, when there is no fault
condition occurring in the system, the value of the residual is zero. But once a
fault occurs, the value of the residual is significantly deviant from zero. There are
many different methods of residual generation such as the observer-based
approach (see, for instance, [11, 13, 30]), parity relation based approach (see, for
instance, [1, 30]), fault detection filter (see, for instance, [1, 4]) etc.



Evaluation of the generated Residual – Once a residual is generated; it is analyzed
to determine whether or not a fault has occurred in the system. There are different
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methods used to decide whether the residual indicates the occurrence of fault or
not. Some of them include, applying a threshold to the residual values [1, 4],
comparing the nature of the residuals to patterns of known faults etc. One residual
is usually sufficient for the purpose of fault detection. For fault isolation,
however, a set of residuals is needed [4, 33].

1.2.2 Model-Free Methods:
In order to use model-based methods for fault diagnosis, a mathematical model of the
system is required. But, it may not always be possible to represent a system in terms of an
accurate mathematical model, due to the inherent complexity of the given system. Also, it
may not be possible to model all the faults, such that their characteristics are
mathematically represented. In such cases, model-free methods are used. Some of the
model-free methods used are – limit checking [14, 11], trend checking [14], Principal
Component Analysis (see, for instance, [14, 11]).

Limit checking involves the monitoring of all the measured variables in a system and
subsequently comparing their absolute values with some preset threshold values [14, 11].
It is one of the most simple and the most commonly used method. Generally, there are
two sets of threshold values, a maximum value and a minimum value. When the absolute
value of a measured variable lies between these two values, it means that the system is
functioning normally.
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Another model-free method that is used commonly is the PCA method. The acronym
PCA stands for Principal Component Analysis. Principal Component Analysis involves
the linear transformation of an original set of correlated variables, into a new set of
uncorrelated variables [14, 33, 11]. These new set of uncorrelated variables are known as
‘principal components’. The main aspect of the PCA method is reducing the
dimensionality of the given problem, while preserving the variation existing in the
original set of variables. Initially a PCA model is generated, from the data collected when
the system is in a steady state. This initial data is also used to calculate the limits for
certain statistical measures – T2 statistics and the Q statistic (also known as the Square
Prediction Error) [14, 33, 11]. Then, in order to monitor the system, it is sufficient to
monitor the statistical measures of the current observations and there is no longer a
necessity to keep track of several variables simultaneously. A fault is said to occur in the
system, when the statistic measures of the current observation surpass the limiting values
that have been calculated previously.

1.3 Research Motivation
Many conventional methods described above, which are used for fault diagnosis, are
based on linear system models. But most of the systems encountered practically, are
nonlinear systems. Therefore it is necessary to develop techniques for fault diagnosis in
nonlinear systems. A lot of research has been conducted, in the area of fault diagnosis
and fault accommodation of nonlinear systems [1, 2, 9, 11, 14, 8, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 29,
32]. One of the methods for fault diagnosis is based on adaptive and learning techniques
[15, 16, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29].
8

One of the essential areas of fault diagnosis is sensor validation [28, 34, 22, 3]. A fault in
the output of a sensor may lead to certain undesirable situations, such as improper
regulation and instability of the system. Another area of importance in fault diagnosis is
the detection and accommodation of process faults, which are the faults that occur within
the system. But, in many nonlinear fault diagnostic methods, process faults and sensor
faults are dealt such that, at any given time, only type of fault case is assumed to occur in
the system. To be more specific, while dealing with process faults [35, 37], one of the
main assumptions is that there are no sensor faults occurring in the system, and while
dealing with sensor faults [38], the assumption is that there are no process faults in the
system. The drawback with this approach is that, when dealing with practical cases, a
process fault may be misdiagnosed as a sensor fault and vice versa. This may lead to
incorrect fault accommodation and also cause a false alarm to be raised. Therefore, in
order to achieve accurate fault diagnostics, it is essential that both the sensors and the
system components be monitored using a unified method.

In a previous paper [39], a unified fault diagnosis method for sensor faults and process
faults was developed for a class of nonlinear uncertain systems, in which the known
nonlinearity is represented as a function of known system signals (i.e. measurable input
and output signals). However in many nonlinear systems, the nonlinearity is a function of
partially measurable system states. Therefore it is necessary to extend the fault diagnostic
method by considering nonlinear systems, whose nonlinearity is a function of the input
and the partially measured states.
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Based on the research motivation, the aims of this thesis are as follows
1. To develop a unified framework for the detection and isolation of sensor faults
and process faults in nonlinear systems.
2. To apply the diagnostic algorithm to an application example and conduct the FDI
design.
3. To develop a Simulink model of the fault diagnosis system and conduct the
simulation studies to verify the effectiveness of the FDI algorithm.

1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized into the following chapters.
Chapter 1 is an introduction to fault diagnosis and some of the terms and concepts
involved. Some of the previous research done in this area is also mentioned and an
overview of the thesis is given.
Chapter 2 details the problem formulation for sensor and process fault diagnosis, for
Lipschitz nonlinear systems. This chapter also contains the various assumptions made
and the conditions that are required to be met, while designing the fault detection
estimator and the fault isolation estimators.
Chapter 3 describes the procedure of fault modeling. In this paper, two types of faults –
sensor faults and process faults are considered. The fault detection scheme using modelbased methods is explained. Subsequently, the fault isolation estimator design for the
sensor faults and process faults is described.
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Chapter 4 contains the fault detection estimator design. The design of the threshold that is
used to detect the fault condition is explained.
Chapter 5 explains the design of the fault isolation estimators that are used to isolate and
estimate the faults introduced in the single-link robotic arm.
Chapter 6 presents the simulation example for the case of a single-link robotic arm with a
revolute elastic joint. Two types of faults – sensor faults and process faults are introduced
into the system. Then, the process of fault detection, fault estimation and fault isolation,
for each fault is illustrated.
Chapter 7 consists of the results and graphs obtained from the simulation example given
in chapter 6.
Chapter 8 details conclusions drawn from the simulation example that has been given
chapter 6 and the scope of future research in this topic.

11

2.

Formulation of the problem

We consider of a class of nonlinear multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) dynamic systems is
described by
𝑥 = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐷𝜁 𝑥, 𝑢 + 𝑔 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝜑 𝑥, 𝑢, 𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑥 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑢)
(1)

𝑦 = 𝐶𝑥 + 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑦 𝐹𝜃

where 𝑥 Є 𝑅 𝑛 is the state vector, 𝑢 Є 𝑅 𝑚 is the input vector, 𝑦 Є 𝑅 𝑝 is the output vector.
The known nominal model is represented by
𝑥𝑁 = 𝐴𝑥𝑁 + 𝑔 𝑦𝑁 , 𝑢 + 𝐷𝜁 𝑥𝑁 , 𝑢
𝑦𝑁 = 𝐶𝑥𝑁

(2)

where the matrices 𝐷 Є 𝑅 𝑛×𝜈 and 𝐶 Є 𝑅 𝑝×𝑛 are of full rank and 𝐴, 𝐶 is an observable
pair.
The modeling uncertainty is represented by vector 𝜑 in (1), the term 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑥 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑢)
represents the change in the system dynamics due to a process fault, and the term
𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑦 𝐹𝜃 represents the change in system dynamics due to a sensor fault. In particular,

the function 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑥 and the function 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑦 are the fault time profiles of the
process fault and the sensor fault respectively with 𝑇𝑥 being the instant of time at which
the process fault occurs and 𝑇𝑦 being the instant of time at which the sensor fault occurs.
The function 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑢) specifies the effect of the process fault [37]. Similarly the function 𝐹
is the fault distribution matrix, which specifies the location of the sensor fault, while the
scalar 𝜃 represents the magnitude of the constant sensor bias [38].
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Assumption 1 [37, 38]. The matrix 𝐷 in (1) satisfies the conditions,
(i)

The rank (CD) = 𝜈,

(ii)

All the invariant zeros of (A,D,C) (if they exist) lie in the left half plane (see [23]).

Remark: When the nonlinearity and the modeling uncertainty terms in (1) are not
considered, then the system matrix of the system given in (1), can be written as
Σ =

𝑠𝐼 − 𝐴
−𝐶

𝐷
0

(3)

When the system matrix in (3) is represented in the Smith form, then the roots of the
invariant polynomials are defined as the invariant zeros of the system [23].
Then, as per [6] and Assumption 1, there exists a linear change of coordinates 𝑧 = 𝑇𝑥 =
[𝑧1𝑇

𝑧2𝑇 ]𝑇 with 𝑧1 𝜖 𝑅 (𝑛−𝑝) and 𝑧2 𝜖 𝑅 𝑝 , so that the system described in (1) becomes a

special case of the following model in the new coordinate system [38].
𝑧1 = 𝛢11 𝑧1 + 𝐴12 𝑧2 + 𝜓1 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝜂1 (𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑡)
𝑧2 = 𝐴21 𝑧1 + 𝐴22 𝑧2 + 𝜌 𝑧, 𝑢 + 𝜓2 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝜂2 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑥 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑢)
(4)

𝑦 = 𝐶 𝑧2 + 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑦 𝐹𝜃
𝐴

𝐴

where, 𝑇𝐴𝑇 −1 = 𝐴11 𝐴12 and the matrix 𝐴11 𝜖 𝑅
21
22

𝑛−𝑝 ×(𝑛−𝑝)

0

is stable, 𝑇𝐷 = 𝐷 , and
2

the matrix 𝐷2 𝜖 𝑅 𝑝×𝜐 , 𝐶𝑇 −1 = [0 𝐼𝑝 ], where 𝐼𝑝 𝜖 𝑅 𝑝×𝑝 is an identity matrix. The term 𝜌 is
a smooth vector field representing the known system nonlinearity.

Remark: The transformation matrix T can be obtained by following the procedure given
below (see [5]). Let (A,D,C) be a linear system with p > ν and rank (CD) = ν. Then a
change of coordinates exists so that the system triple with respect to the new coordinates
has the following structure:
13

a) The system matrix can be written as
𝐴=

b)

𝐴11
𝐴21

𝐴12
𝐴22

(5)

The input distribution matrix can be written as
𝐷=

0
𝐷2

(6)

c) The output distribution matrix can be written as
𝐶 = [0

𝑇𝑜 ]

(7)

where 𝑇𝑜 is orthogonal.
First, we apply an initial transformation matrix 𝑇𝐶 such that the structure of the
transformed output distribution matrix is of the form [0 𝐼𝑝 ].
The resulting matrices, after the application of the transformation matrix 𝑇𝐶 are given as –
𝐴𝐶 = 𝑇𝐶 𝐴𝑇𝐶−1
𝐷𝐶 = 𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐷
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝑇𝐶 −1

Then, we apply another transformation matrix 𝑇𝐵 in order to obtain the input distribution
matrix in the desired structure. The resulting matrices after the application of the
transformation matrix 𝑇𝐵 can be written as –
𝐴 = 𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝐵−1
𝐷 = 𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝐵 −1

The above matrices can also be expressed in the form of the original matrices, as given
below –

14

𝐴 = 𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐴 ∗ 𝑇𝐶−1 ∗ 𝑇𝐵−1 = 𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐴 ∗ (𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 )−1
𝐷 = (𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 ) ∗ 𝐷
𝐶 = 𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝐶−1 ∗ 𝑇𝐵 −1 = 𝐶 ∗ (𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 )−1
0

In this coordinate system, the input distribution matrix is of the form 𝐷 = 𝐷 and the
2
output distribution matrix is of the form 𝐶 = [0 𝑇𝑜 ]. Therefore it can be observed that
the transformation matrix that is to be applied to the system matrices in the original
system of coordinates is

𝑇 = (𝑇𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 )

Then, the output distribution matrix 𝐶 = [0 𝑇𝑜 ] can be easily converted to the form
𝐶1 = [0

𝐼𝑝 ], through another coordinate transformation.

In this thesis, it is assumed that at a given time, there is an occurrence of only one fault in
the system and that the vector F specifies the location of the sensor fault. So, the general
structure of the vector F is such that one of its components has the value of 1, while all
the other elements are zeros (similar to [38]). The number of components in the F matrix
is equal to the number of sensors whose measurements are to be monitored, such that
each component in the vector F corresponds to a particular sensor in the system. Then, a
sensor fault occurring in the system is modeled as in. We specify the location of the fault
by assigning a value of one to a particular component in the vector F which corresponds
to that sensor whose measurements are incorrect. This vector is then multiplied by the
value of the constant bias in the sensor. The value of the constant sensor bias is
represented with a scalar 𝜃.
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For the purpose of process fault isolation, it is assumed that there are 𝑁 types of possible
process faults. If all these possible types of process faults are represented as a fault set,
then the unknown fault function in (1) belongs to the set of faults represented by –
𝑓 ≜ 𝑓 1 𝑦, 𝑢 , … , 𝑓 𝑁 𝑦, 𝑢

(8)

Here, each fault type 𝑓 𝑠 , 𝑠 = 1, … . 𝑁, is of the form (see [37]) –
𝑓 𝑠 𝑦, 𝑢 ≜ [(𝜃1𝑠 )𝑇 𝑔1𝑠 𝑦, 𝑢 , … , 𝜃𝑁𝑠 )𝑇 𝑔𝑁𝑠 𝑦, 𝑢

𝑇

(9)

where, 𝜃𝑖𝑠 , 𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑁, is an unknown parameter vector and 𝑔𝑖𝑠 represents the structure of
that process fault.

Assumption 2. The unstructured modeling uncertainties in the system denoted by 𝜂1 and
𝜂2 in (3) are bounded by known functions [38], such that –
𝜂1 (𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑡) ≤ 𝜂1 𝑦, 𝑢, 𝑡 ,
𝜂2 (𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑡) ≤ 𝜂2 𝑦, 𝑢, 𝑡

(10)

where the functions 𝜂1 𝑦, 𝑢, 𝑡 and 𝜂2 𝑦, 𝑢, 𝑡 are known and are bounded.
Remark: These bounds are necessary so that it can be determined whether the
inconsistencies in the behavior of the system are to be attributed to the fault occurring in
the system or to the modeling inconsistencies present in the system model.

Assumption 3. The system state vector 𝑧 remains bounded prior to and subsequent to the
occurrence of the fault.
Remark: This assumption means that the system is assumed to be stable and is capable
of returning to its stable state of functioning even after the occurrence of a fault [38]. To
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be more precise, this assumption assumes that the feedback control system has the ability
to maintain the state variables within their respective bounds prior to and subsequent to
the fault occurrence.

Assumption 4. The known nonlinear term 𝜌(𝑧, 𝑢) is uniformly Lipschitz, that is –

𝜌 𝑧, 𝑢 − 𝜌(𝑧, u) ≤ 𝛾 𝑧 − 𝑧

(11)

where 𝛾 is the known Lipschitz constant [38].
Remark: As per Assumption 4, it is necessary, that the known nonlinear term, in the
equations representing the system dynamics, satisfy the Lipschitz condition. Examples of
the nonlinearities that satisfy the Lipschitz condition include the sinusoidal signals used
in robotics research [22].
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3.

Architecture of Fault Detection and Isolation

One of the common schemes used in fault diagnosis is the observer scheme. The observer
scheme used in this thesis follows the general architecture proposed in [36, 39]. As
shown in Fig. 5, the Fault Detection and Isolation architecture consists of 𝑝 + 𝑁 +
1 nonlinear adaptive estimators, where 𝑝 is the number of sensor measurements, 𝑁 is the

number of types of process faults. Therefore, out of the 𝑝 + 𝑁 + 1 nonlinear adaptive
estimators, 𝑝 + 𝑁 nonlinear adaptive estimators, known as fault isolation estimators
(FIEs) [36, 39], are used to determine the type of the fault that has occurred in the system.
They are activated once a fault has been detected. The remaining single nonlinear
adaptive estimator is the fault detection estimator (FDE), which is used to detect the
occurrence of faults in the given system model. Each FIE is designed based on the
functional structure of the potential fault.

Fault Detection
Estimator

Process Fault
Isolation Estimators

Fault Detection
Decision Scheme

activation

Sensor Fault
Isolation Estimators
Input

Feedback
Controller

Detection
Decision

Fault Isolation
Decision
Scheme

Nonlinear Plant
u

y

Figure 5: The Architecture of the Fault Detection and Isolation Scheme [39]
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Isolation
Decision

3.1 Fault Detection Components
The fault detection takes place in the Fault Detection Estimator (FDE) and the Fault
Detection Decision Scheme (FDDS). The inputs given to the FDE are the input and the
output signals of the system. The FDE then generates an estimated output which is then
compared to the actual output. The difference between the two is termed as a ‘residual’.
The generated residual is compared to a pre-designed threshold in the Fault Detection
Decision block. Based on the relation of the threshold and the residual, the following
conclusions are drawn
1.

If the residual always remains below the threshold, it is concluded that no fault

has occurred in the system.
2.

If the residual exceeds the threshold at some finite time, it is concluded that a fault

has occurred in the system at that instant of time.
The output of the Fault Detection Decision block serves as an alarm, in the case a fault
has been detected and also as an activation signal to the fault isolation blocks, to
determine the type of the fault that has occurred in the system.

3.2 Fault Isolation Components
Once a fault has been detected by the Fault Detection Decision block, a set of Fault
Isolation Estimators (FIEs) are triggered in order to isolate the fault from the system.
These four fault isolation estimators can be grouped into two types – process fault
isolation estimators and sensor fault isolation estimators, as shown in Fig. 5.
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The process fault isolation estimators block, represents a bank of fault isolation
estimators, each of which is modeled on the structure of a process fault under
consideration. Each of the fault isolation estimators in the process fault isolation
estimators block , also generate residuals and corresponding thresholds, but they are
used for fault isolation unlike those used for fault detection in the fault detection
estimator.

Similarly, the sensor fault isolation estimators block, represents a bank of fault isolation
estimators, each of which is modeled on the structure of a sensor fault. Again, each of the
fault isolation estimators in the sensor fault isolation estimators block, also generate
residuals and corresponding thresholds, for sensor fault isolation.

The residuals generated by these two FIE blocks are given as inputs to the fault isolation
decision block. As mentioned previously, we consider that 𝑝 is the number of sensor
measurements, hence 𝑝 is the number of sensor faults. Also, we consider that 𝑁 is the
number of types of process faults so that a total of 𝑝 + N faults are considered. Then,
within a unified framework [39], if s represents the fault case under consideration, then
for s = 1,… 𝑝, the fault s is a type of sensor fault and for s = 𝑝 + 1,… 𝑝 + N, the fault s is
a type of process fault.
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The fault isolation decision logic follows the general idea presented in [36]. The adaptive
thresholds are designed in such a way, that for a fault in the sth component, where s =
1,… N, all the residuals generated by the sth fault isolation estimator always remain
below their corresponding thresholds. Simultaneously, in the case of each of the
remaining fault isolation estimators (assuming that all the fault cases are sufficiently
different) at least one of the residual components would cross their corresponding
threshold at a certain instant of time. Therefore, the type of the fault that has occurred can
be determined.

Some of the observer schemes used are – dedicated observer scheme [1, 2] and the
generalized observer scheme [1, 2]. Assuming that there are a total of ‘N’ of faults in the
system, the FDI architecture of both the schemes consist of ‘N’ observers or state
estimators. The design of dedicated observer scheme consists of ‘N’ state estimators such
that s-th residual is sensitive to the s-th fault. The decision of fault detection is made if
the s-th residual exceeds its threshold. On the other hand, the generalized observer FDI
architecture compromises of ‘N’ state estimators such that the s-th residual is sensitive to
all the faults excepting the s-th fault. The fault is detected when the s-th residual exceeds
the thresholds generated by all the state estimators excepting the s-th state estimator. The
FDI design that is developed in this thesis is based on the generalized observer scheme.
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4.

Design of Fault Detection Estimator

4.1 Fault Detection Estimator
In this chapter, the actual design of the Fault Detection Estimator is discussed. Based on
the system model described by (2), the fault detection estimator (FDE) is chosen as
described by the equations below (see [38])
𝑧1 = 𝐴11 𝑧1 + 𝐴12 𝐶 −1 𝑦 + 𝜓1 𝑦, 𝑢
𝑧2 = 𝐴21 𝑧1 + 𝐴22 𝑧2 + 𝜌 𝑧 + 𝜓2 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝐿(𝑦 − 𝑦)
(12)

𝑦 = 𝐶 𝑧2 ,

In the above equation, 𝑧1 and 𝑧2 and 𝑦 are the estimated state and output variables
respectively. In addition, 𝐿 is the design gain matrix and 𝑧 ≜ [(𝑧1 )𝑇 (𝐶 −1 𝑦)𝑇 ]𝑇 . The
initial conditions are taken as, 𝑧1 0 = 0 and 𝑧2 0 = 0. The residual for fault detection
is then generated as (𝑦 − 𝑦), where 𝑦 is the actual output and 𝑦 is the estimated output.

4.2 Adaptive Threshold Design for Fault Detection
The generated residual is then compared with the threshold to make a diagnostic decision.
Next, the details of the threshold design are shown (similar to the threshold design in
[38]).
If the state estimation errors are denoted by the terms 𝑧1 ≜ 𝑧1 − 𝑧1 and 𝑧2 ≜ 𝑧2 − 𝑧2 and
the output estimation error is denoted by the term, 𝑦 ≜ 𝑦 − 𝑦, then prior to the
occurrence of the fault, (for t < 𝑇0 ), the system dynamics are given by

22

𝑧1 = 𝐴11 𝑧1 + 𝜂1 (𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑡)

(13)

𝑧2 = 𝐴21 𝑧1 + 𝐴22 𝑧2 + 𝜌 𝑧 − 𝜌 𝑧 + 𝜂2 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑡

(14)

𝑦 = 𝐶 𝑧2 ,

(15)

where 𝐴22 ≜ 𝐴22 - 𝐿𝐶 . Since 𝐶 is nonsingular, 𝐿 can always be chosen, such that 𝐴22 is
stable.

By using (13) and (10) and then applying the triangle inequality, we get
𝑡

≤ 𝑘0 𝜔1 𝑒 −𝜆 0 𝑡 + 𝑘0

𝑧1 𝑡

𝑒 −𝜆 0

𝑡−𝜏

𝜂1 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝜏 𝑑𝜏,

(16)

0

where 𝑘0 and 𝜆0 are positive constants, chosen such that 𝑒 𝐴11 𝑡 ≤ 𝑘0 𝑒 −𝜆 0 𝑡 and 𝜔1 is a
constant bound for 𝑧1 0 . Since 𝐴11 is stable, the constants 𝑘0 and 𝜆0 always exist.

Now, the output estimation error 𝑦(𝑡) ≜ 𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑦(𝑡) is analyzed. By using (10), we have
𝑡

𝑡

𝐶𝑗 𝑒 𝐴22

𝑦𝑗 𝑡

𝑡−𝜏

𝐶𝑗 𝑒 𝐴22

𝐴21 𝑧1 𝜏 + 𝜌 𝑧 − 𝜌 𝑧 𝑑𝜏 +

0

𝑡−𝜏

𝜂2 𝑑𝜏 ,

0

(17)

Since
𝑧 𝜏 − 𝑧 𝜏 =

𝑧1 𝜏 − 𝑧1 𝜏
𝑧2 𝜏 − 𝐶 −1 𝑦 𝜏

=

𝑧1 𝜏
0

.

Therefore, we get –
𝑧(𝜏) − 𝑧(𝜏) = 𝑧1 (𝜏)

(18)

Making use of eq. (17), (10) and (11), we have –
𝑦𝑗 𝑡

≤ 𝑘𝑗

𝑡 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡−𝜏
𝑒
0

𝐴21 + 𝛾 𝑧1 𝜏

𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘𝑗

𝑡
0

𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗

𝑡−𝜏

𝜂2 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝜏 𝑑𝜏
(19)

+ 𝑘𝑗 𝜔2 𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡 ,
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where 𝑘𝑗 and 𝜆𝑗 are positive constants chosen such that 𝐶𝑗 𝑒 𝐴22 𝑡 ≤ 𝑘𝑗 𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡 and 𝜔2 is a
constant bound for 𝑧2 0 .

From (16) and (19), we have
𝑡

𝑡

𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗

𝜈𝑗 𝑡 ≜ 𝑘𝑗

𝑡−𝜏

𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗

𝐴21 + 𝛾 𝜒 𝜏 𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘𝑗

0

𝑡−𝜏

𝜂2 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝜏 𝑑𝜏

0

+ 𝑘𝑗 𝜔2 𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡 ,

(20)

where
𝜒 𝜏 ≜ 𝑘0 𝜔0 𝑒 −𝜆 0 𝑡 + 𝑘0

𝑡
0

𝑒 −𝜆 0 (𝑡−𝜏) 𝜂1 (𝑧, 𝑢, 𝜏)𝑑𝜏 .

(21)

Based on the above discussions, the following fault detection decision scheme can be
used.
The decision that a fault has occurred, is made when the absolute value of at least one
component of the output estimation error 𝑦𝑗 𝑡 , exceeds its corresponding threshold
𝜈𝑗 𝑡 (similar to [38]), given by –
𝜈𝑗 (𝑡) ≜ 𝑘𝑗

𝑡 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡−𝜏
𝑒
0

𝐴21 + 𝛾 𝜒(𝜏) 𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘𝑗

𝑡 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡−𝜏
𝑒
0

𝜂2 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝜏 𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘𝑗 𝜔2 𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗 𝑡 .

The instant of time at which at least one of the residual component (or the output
estimation error component) exceeds its corresponding threshold is termed as the ‘fault
detection time’.

There are basically two kinds of thresholds – fixed thresholds and adaptive thresholds [1,
2, 30]. A fixed threshold is a constant value and an adaptive threshold is a time varying
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function. Note that while designing, it is usually better to opt for designing an adaptive
threshold rather than a fixed threshold, in order to avoid the problem of false alarms and
missed detections. When a normal situation is determined as a faulty situation, it is
termed as a false alarm. When a faulty situation is determined as a normal situation, it is
termed as missed detections. This is illustrated in Fig. 6 given below.

Figure 6: Adaptive threshold vs. fixed threshold [30]
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5.

Design of Fault Isolation Estimators

In this section, we describe the fault isolation method, including fault isolation estimator
design and the isolation decision scheme.

5.1 Fault Isolation Estimators for Sensors Faults
Assuming a fault has been detected at time 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑑 , the FIEs are activated. The design of
each FIE is similar to the design of the FIEs in [38], where the design of each FIE is
based on the functional structure of one of the possible cases of sensor faults. In this case
we have 𝑝 nonlinear adaptive estimators to estimate each sensor fault; for each 𝑘 =
1, … , 𝑝, the design equations are
𝑧1𝑘 = 𝐴11 𝑧1𝑘 + 𝐴12 𝐶 −1 𝑦 − 𝐹 𝑘 𝜃 𝑘 + 𝜓1 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝛺1𝑘 𝜃 𝑘

(22)

𝑧2𝑘 = 𝐴21 𝑧1𝑘 + 𝐴22 𝑧2𝑘 + 𝜌 𝑧 𝑘 , 𝑢 + 𝜓2 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝐿𝑘 𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑘 + 𝛺2𝑘 𝜃 𝑘

(23)

𝛺1𝑘 = 𝐴11 𝛺1𝑘 − 𝐴12 𝐶 −1 𝐹 𝑘

(24)

𝛺2𝑘 = 𝐴22 𝛺2𝑘 − 𝐿𝑘 𝐹 𝑘

(25)

𝑦 𝑘 = 𝐶 𝑧2𝑘 + 𝐹 𝑘 𝜃 𝑘

(26)

where 𝑧1𝑘 , 𝑧2𝑘 and 𝑦 𝑘 represent the estimated state and output variables respectively. In
addition, 𝐿𝑘 is the design gain matrix, 𝜃 𝑘 is the estimate of the sensor bias provided by the
𝑘-th isolation estimator. The initial conditions are 𝑧1𝑘 𝑇𝑑 = 0, 𝑧2𝑘 𝑇𝑑 = 0, Ω1𝑘 𝑇𝑑 = 0

and Ω𝑘2 𝑇𝑑 = 0.
The adaption law for adjusting 𝜃 𝑘 is given (similar to [38]) as –
(27)

𝜃 𝑘 = 𝑃Θ 𝑘 {Γy 𝐶 Ω𝑘2 + 𝐹 𝑘 )𝑇 𝑦 𝑘
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where Γy is the learning rate, 𝑃Θ 𝑘 is a projection operator, that restricts the value of 𝜃 𝑘 to
the corresponding known set Θ𝑘 to ensure the stability of the learning algorithm in the
occurrence of modeling uncertainty [7, 13] and 𝑦 𝑘 is the output estimation error. The
parameter estimate provides fault information. But it cannot be guaranteed that in the
case of matched fault isolation estimator, the parameter estimate will converge to the
actual value of the fault magnitude, except if we assume persistent excitation [7, 13].

5.2 Fault Isolation Estimators for Process Faults
Assuming a fault has been detected at time 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑑 , the FIEs are activated. Each FIE is
designed based on the functional structure of one potential fault [37]. In this case we have
𝑁 nonlinear adaptive estimators to estimate each process fault; for each 𝑞 = 1, … , 𝑁, we

have
𝑞

𝑞

𝑞

𝑞

𝑧1 = 𝐴11 𝑧1 + 𝐴12 𝐶 −1 𝑦 + 𝜓1 𝑦, 𝑢

(28)

𝑞

𝑞

𝑧2 = 𝐴21 𝑧1 + 𝐴22 𝑧2 + 𝜌 𝑧 𝑞 , 𝑢 + 𝜓2 𝑦, 𝑢 + 𝐿𝑞 𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛺𝑥 𝜗 𝑞
+𝑓 𝑞 𝑦, 𝑢, 𝜗 𝑞

(29)

𝑞

(30)

𝑞

𝛺𝑥 = 𝐴22 𝛺𝑥 − 𝐺 𝑞 (𝑦, 𝑢)
𝑞

𝑦 𝑞 = 𝐶 𝑧2

(31)
𝑞

In the above equations 𝑧1, 𝑧2𝑞 and 𝑦 𝑞 represent the estimated state and output variables
respectively. In addition, 𝐿𝑞 denotes the design gain matrix, 𝑓 𝑞 (𝑦, 𝑢, 𝜗 𝑞 ) is the estimate of
the fault function provided by the 𝑞-th isolation estimator. As shown in (8), the fault
𝑞

approximation model 𝑓 𝑞 is made linear in the adjustable weights 𝜗 . Therefore gradient
𝑞

matrix 𝐺 𝑞 does not depend on 𝜗 .
The adaption law for adjusting 𝜗 𝑞 is given below (similar to [37])
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𝑞𝑇

𝜗 𝑞 = 𝑃Θ 𝑞 {Γ𝑥 𝛺𝑥 𝐶 𝑇 𝑦 𝑞 }

(32)

where Γ𝑥 is the learning rate, 𝑃Θ 𝑞 is a projection operator, that restricts the value of 𝜗 𝑞 to
the corresponding known set Θ𝑞 to ensure the stability of the learning algorithm in the
occurrence of modeling uncertainty and 𝑦 𝑞 is the output estimation error.

5.3 Fault Isolation Decision Scheme for sensor and process faults
If this thesis, we consider a total of 𝑝 sensor faults and 𝑁 process faults. A fault case 𝑠 is
considered a sensor fault when 𝑠 = 1, . . 𝑝. Similarly, when 𝑠 = 𝑝 + 1, . . 𝑝 + 𝑁, the fault case
is considered a process fault. The decision of fault isolation is based on the general idea
in [36]. If a fault occurs in the 𝑠-th component at time 𝑇0 , then for the set of residual
components generated by the 𝑠-th isolation estimator, a corresponding set of adaptive
thresholds 𝜇𝑗𝑠 𝑡 can be designed. These thresholds are designed so that the condition
𝑦𝑗𝑠 𝑡

≤ 𝜇𝑗𝑠 𝑡 (for all 𝑡 > 𝑇𝑑 ) is satisfied by the 𝑗-th component of its output estimation

error. Here, 𝑇𝑑 is the time at which the fault is detected.

The design of adaptive threshold for fault isolation has been investigated in [37, 38].
Below, we directly give the result.
If a sensor fault occurs, the 𝑗-th component of the output estimation error of the 𝑠-th
isolation estimator satisfies the inequality [38] –
𝑦𝑗𝑠 𝑡

𝑡

𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗

≤ 𝑘𝑗

𝑡−𝜏

𝑇𝑑

+ 𝛾 𝐶 −1 𝐹 𝑠 𝜃 s

𝐴21 + 𝛾 𝜒 𝑠 𝜏 + 𝛺1𝑠 𝜃 s

+ 𝜂2

𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘𝑗 𝜔2 𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗 (𝑡−𝑇𝑑 ) + 𝐶𝑗 𝛺2𝑠 + 𝐹𝑗𝑠 𝜃 s
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(33)

where
𝑡

𝜒 𝑠 𝜏 ≜ 𝑘0

𝑒 −𝜆 0

𝑡−𝜏

[𝜂1 𝑥, 𝑢, 𝜏 ]𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘0 𝜔1 𝑒 −𝜆 0 (𝑡− 𝑇𝑑 )

(34)

𝑇𝑑

If a process fault occurs, at a time 𝑇𝑑 , then for 𝑡 > 𝑇𝑑 , the 𝑗-th component of the output
estimation error of the 𝑠-th isolation estimator satisfies the following inequality [37]
𝑦𝑗𝑠 𝑡

≤ 𝑘𝑗

𝑡
𝑇𝑑

𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗

+ (𝐶𝑗 𝛺𝑥𝑠 )

𝑇

𝑡−𝜏

𝐴21 + 𝛾 𝜒 𝑠 𝜏 + 𝜂2 (𝑦, 𝑢, 𝜏) 𝑑𝜏

𝜗 𝑠 + 𝑘𝑗 𝜔2 𝑒 −𝜆 𝑗 (𝑡−𝑇𝑑 )

(35)

where –
𝑡

𝜒 𝑠 𝜏 ≜ 𝑘0

𝑒 −𝜆 0

𝑡−𝜏

[𝜂1 𝑥, 𝑢, 𝜏 ]𝑑𝜏 + 𝑘0 𝜔1 𝑒 −𝜆 0 (𝑡− 𝑇𝑑 )

(36)

𝑇𝑑

The terms on the right hand side of (33) and (35) are used to design the adaptive
thresholds for the purpose of fault isolation. The effect of the bounds 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 decreases
exponentially, therefore the performance of the fault isolation algorithm is not affected
significantly.
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6.

Simulation Example and FDI Implementation

6.1 System Dynamics and Fault Model
In this chapter, we use a single-link robotic arm example considered in [38] to illustrate
the effectiveness of the unified FDI method. The motion equations are given by –
𝐽𝑙 𝑞1 + 𝐹𝑙 𝑞1 + 𝑘 𝑞1 − 𝑞2 + 𝑚𝑔 sin 𝑞1 = 0
𝐽𝑚 𝑞2 + 𝐹𝑚 𝑞2 − 𝑘 𝑞1 − 𝑞2 = 𝑘𝜏 𝑢

(37)

where 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 are the angular positions of the link and the motor respectively. The
other parameters in the equation are link inertia 𝐽𝑙 ; the motor rotor inertia 𝐽𝑚 ; the
elastic constant 𝑘, the link mass 𝑚, the gravity constant 𝑔, the center of mass  and the
viscous friction coefficients 𝐹𝑙 and 𝐹𝑚 . In this simulation study, the above parameters
take the following values; 𝑘 = 2 Nm rad , 𝐹𝑚 = 1 Nm V , 𝐹𝑙 = 0.5 Nm V , 𝐽𝑚 = 1 kg m2 ,
𝐽𝑙 = 4.5 kg m2 , 𝑚 = 4 kg , 𝑔 = 9.8m/s2 ,  = 0.5 m, 𝑘𝜏 = 1 Nm/V. The initial conditions
𝑡

of the plant are, 𝑞1 0 = 𝑞2 0 = 0. The input to the system is 𝑢 = 2 sin(2). The states
chosen are, 𝑥1 = 𝑞1 , 𝑥2 = 𝑞1 , 𝑥3 = 𝑞2 , 𝑥4 = 𝑞2 . It is also assumed that the motor position,
the link velocity and the link position are measured.

Then, the above model can be rewritten in state space form as follows
0
0
𝑥1
1
0
−𝑘
𝐽
𝑘
𝐽
𝑥2
0
𝑙 −𝐹𝑙 𝐽𝑙
𝑙
=
1
0
0
𝑥3
0
𝑘 𝐽𝑚
−𝑘 𝐽𝑚 −𝐹𝑚 𝐽𝑚
𝑥4
0

𝑦 =

1
0
0

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

𝑥1
𝑥2
𝑥3
𝑥4

𝑥1
𝑥2
𝑥3 +
𝑥4

0
−mgh
Jl

sin 𝑥1
0

𝑘𝜏
𝐽𝑚

𝑢

(38)
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−50 0 0 0
By using a linear change of coordinates with 𝑇 = −1 −1 0 0
0
0 1 0
0
0 0 1

The state space model in the new coordinate system is
𝑧1
𝑧2

−1
0
0
50
−0.027
−0.44
0
0.89
=
0
0
0
1
−0.04
−2 −1
0

𝑧1
𝑧2 +

0
−4.36sin
0
𝑢

𝑧1
50

+ 𝜂 𝑥, 𝑢, 𝑡

+ 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑥 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑢)
𝑦 =

−1 0
0 1
0 0

0
0 𝑧2 + 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑦 𝐹𝜃
1

(39)

The terms 𝜂(𝑥, 𝑢, 𝑡), 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑥 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑢) and 𝛽 𝑡 − 𝑇𝑦 𝐹𝜃 which represent the effects of the
modeling uncertainty, the process faults and the sensor faults, are added to the state space
equations of the system in the new coordinate system.

When we compare the state space model given above, to the general equation
representation of nonlinear systems given by (4), it can be observed that, 𝜓1 = 0 and
𝜓2 = [0 0 𝑢]𝑇 and 𝜌 = [−4.36sin 𝑥4 0 0]𝑇 .

For the given plant model, the nonlinearity in the system is a nonlinear function of the
state variables, satisfying a Lipschitz condition. In this case, the nonlinear term
−4.36sin

𝑧1
50

has a Lipschitz constant 𝛾 = 0.087. According to the Assumption 2 in

Chapter 2, the modeling uncertainties in the system are unstructured and unknown
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functions of 𝑧, 𝑢 and 𝑡, but are bound by given functionals. The modeling uncertainty in
the given plant model is assumed to be an inaccuracy of up to 5% in the amplifier gain
𝑘𝜏 [38]. Therefore the bounding functions of the modeling uncertainty are 𝜂1 = 0 and
𝜂2 =

0.05𝑘 𝜏
𝐽𝑚

𝑢(𝑡) .

For the given plant model, four different types of faults are considered. The aim is to
detect, isolate and estimate these faults as accurately as possible. The types of faults
considered in this simulation are – sensor faults and process faults. Upon the occurrence
of any one of these faults in the system, not only should the fault be detected, but the type
of fault, the nature of the fault and the magnitude of the fault should be determined.

The following fault scenarios are considered –


Fault case scenario 1: Sensor fault due to bias in y2
In this case, the fault is considered to have occurred due to a sensor bias in the
sensor measuring the 𝑦2 component of the output (denoted by 𝑦). In the simulation
example we assume that there are three sensors, each sensor measuring each of
the three components of the output signal. The bias is represented by the equation:
0
𝐹 = 𝐹2 = 1 and 𝜃1 , where 𝜃1 is the magnitude of the sensor bias, that appears in
0

the sensor measuring 𝑦2 , in radians. It is assumed that the range of the magnitude
of the sensor bias is 𝜃1 𝜖 [0 0.2].
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Fault case scenario 2: Sensor fault due to bias in y3
The fault is considered to have occurred due to a sensor bias in the sensor
measuring the 𝑦3 component of the output (denoted by 𝑦). The bias is represented
0

by the equation: 𝐹 = 𝐹3 = 0 and 𝜃2 , where 𝜃2 is the magnitude of the sensor
1

bias, that appears in the sensor measuring 𝑦3 , in radians. As in the case of fault
scenario 1, the range of the magnitude of the sensor bias is assumed to be
𝜃2 𝜖 [0 0.2].



Fault case scenario 3: Actuator fault (see [37])
By definition, an actuator fault occurs due to the improper functioning of the
components actuating the system. In this system, the effect of an actuator fault
can be observed in the magnitude of the nominal control input signal being given
to the system. Therefore, when the effect of the actuator fault is taken into the
consideration, the nominal control input can be modeled as 𝑢 = 𝑢 + 𝜗1 𝑢 , where
𝑢 is the nominal control input in the non-fault case. Here, the range of the

parameter 𝜗1 is 𝜗1 𝜖 [−1 0]. The range of the parameter 𝜗1 represents the extent of
the improper functioning of the actuator. The no fault condition is indicated by the
value 𝜗1 = 0, while the complete failure of the actuator is indicated by the
value 𝜗1 = −1. If the structure of the actuator fault is represented by 𝑔1 (𝑢), then
the fault function can be represented by the equation –
𝑓 𝑦, 𝑢 ≜ [0 0 0

𝜗1 𝑔1 (𝑢)]𝑇
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with the fault function structure being, 𝑔1 𝑢 =


𝑘𝜏 𝑢
𝐽𝑚

Fault case scenario 4: Fault leading to increase in friction in the motor (see [37])
The fault is modeled based on its effect on the friction constant, the viscous
friction constant 𝐹𝑚 increases from 1 Nm/V to 3.3 Nm/V. The significance of the
extra friction is given by the parameter 𝜗2 . The range of the parameter is
𝜗2 𝜖 [−1 0]. The structure of the fault can be represented by 𝑔2 (𝑢). The fault

function can be represented by the equation
𝑓 𝑦, 𝑢 ≜ [0 0 0

𝜗2 𝑔2 (𝑢)]𝑇

with the fault function structure being, 𝑔2 𝑢 =

2.3𝑦3
𝐽𝑚

and 𝜗2 = −1

6.2 FDI Design
As explained in the chapters 3, 4 and 5, since there are four types of fault cases that are
being considered, one fault detection estimator (FDE) and four different fault isolation
estimators need to be designed. The equations of the FDE are
𝑧1 = −𝑧1 + −50 0 0 𝑦

(40)

𝑧2 =

4.36sin(𝑧1 /50)
−0.027
0.89 −0.44 0
0
𝑧
+
𝑧
+
+
0
0
0
1 2
0 + 𝐿 𝑦 − 𝑦 (41)
0
1
−0.04
0
−2
−1
𝑢
0

𝑦 =

−1 0
0 1
0 0

0
0 𝑧2
1

(42)

The design equations for the FIEs for the sensor faults are
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𝑧1𝑠 = −1 𝑧1𝑠 + 50 0

0

−1 0
0 1
0 0

0
0
1

𝑦 − 𝐹 𝑠 𝜃 𝑠 + 𝛺1𝑠 𝜃 𝑠

−0.027
−1.5011 −0.44
0
4.36sin
𝑧2𝑠 =
𝑧1𝑠 + −0.44
0
−1.7
3 𝑧2𝑠 +
0
−0.04
0
−3
−0.1
0

(43)
𝑧𝑠
50

0
+ 0 + 𝛺2𝑠 𝜃 𝑠
𝑢

+ 𝐿𝑠 𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑠
𝛺1𝑠 = −1 𝛺1𝑠 − 50 0
−1.5
0
0
−1
𝑦𝑠 = 0
0

𝛺2𝑠 =

(44)
0 𝐶 −1 𝐹 𝑠

(45)

0
0
−1.7
0 𝛺2𝑠 − 𝐿𝑠 𝐹 𝑠
0
−1.9
0 0
1 0 𝑧2𝑠 + 𝐹 𝑠 𝜃 𝑠
0 1

(46)

(47)

The fault parameter estimation is given by the adaptive algorithm for [38]
(48)

𝜃 𝑠 = 𝑃Θ 𝑠 {Γy 𝐶 Ω2𝑠 + 𝐹 𝑠 )𝑇 𝑦 𝑠

To prevent parameter drift as a result of the fault function approximation error, the
projection operator is used [13], such that
𝜃𝑠 = 0

if 𝜃 𝑠 > 𝑀𝜃 and 𝜃 𝑠 > 0 or 𝜃 𝑠 < −𝑀𝜃 and 𝜃 𝑠 < 0

𝜃 𝑠 = {Γy 𝐶 Ω2𝑠 + 𝐹 𝑠 )𝑇 𝑦 𝑠

if 𝜃 𝑠 > 𝑀𝜃

where 𝑀𝜃 is the boundary of the compact set for 𝜃 𝑠 .

The design equations for the FIEs for the process faults are –
𝑧1𝑠 = −1 𝑧1𝑠 + 50 0 0 𝐶 −1 𝑦
𝑧2𝑠 =

(49)

−0.027
−1.5011 −0.44
0
4.36sin
𝑠
𝑧
+
0
−0.44
−1.7
3 𝑧2𝑠 +
1
0
−0.04
0
−3
−0.1
0
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𝑧𝑠
50

0
0 + 𝛺𝑥𝑠 𝜗 𝑠
𝑢

+ 𝐿𝑠 𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑠 + 𝑓 𝑠 (𝑦, 𝑢, 𝜗 𝑠 )

(50)

𝛺𝑥𝑠 =

−1.5
0
0
0
−1.7
0 𝛺𝑥𝑠 + 𝐺 𝑠 𝑦, 𝑢
0
0
−1.9

(51)

𝑦 =

−1 0
0 1
0 0

(52)

0
0 𝑧2𝑠
1

The fault parameter estimation is given by the adaptive algorithm for [37]
𝜗 𝑠 = 𝑃Θ 𝑠 {Γ𝑥 𝛺𝑥𝑠 𝑇 𝐶 𝑇 𝑦 𝑞 }

(53)

To prevent parameter drift as a result of the fault function approximation error, the
projection operator is used [13], such that
𝜗 𝑠 = 0 if 𝜗 𝑠 > 𝑀𝜃 and 𝜗 𝑠 > 0

or 𝜗 𝑠 < −𝑀𝜃 and 𝜗 𝑠 < 0

𝑠𝑇 𝑇 𝑞

𝜗 𝑠 = {Γ𝑥 𝛺𝑥 𝐶 𝑦 } if 𝜗 𝑠 > 𝑀𝜃

−2.3889 −0.4444
0
0
1.7
1 so that the poles
0
−2
−0.9

The observer gain matrix 𝐿 is set to be 𝐿 =

of the matrix 𝐴22 are situated at −1.5, −1.7 and −1.9. The other constants are chosen so
that their values are 𝑘0 = 𝑘1 = 𝑘2 = 𝑘3 = 1, 𝜆0 = 1, 𝜆1 = 1.2, 𝜆2 = 1.4, 𝜆3 = 1.9 .

6.3 Simulink Model Implementation
For the diagnostic system described above, a simulink model has to be developed. The
Simulink model for the given system is shown in Fig. 7 below.
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Figure 7: The Simulink model of the FDI algorithm for the single-link robotic arm

The block diagram shown above can be divided into three blocks –


The single-link robotic arm system



The fault detection block



The Fault isolation and estimation block

It is assumed that all the fault cases in this thesis are abrupt faults. Therefore the fault
time profile can expressed in the form of a step function, where the fault occurs at the
instant of time 𝑇0 . When a fault occurs in the system, it is represented by adding a step
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function that has been multiplied with the fault function, whose structure has been
modeled on the fault that has been introduced into the system.

The fault detection block consists of the fault detection estimator for the system. As per
the derivations in Chapter 4, if the output can be divided into three components, then a
threshold is to be designed for each component. If any one of the output residual
components crosses its corresponding threshold, then the conclusion is that a fault has
occurred in the system. The output of this block is an activation signal to the fault
isolation and estimation subsystem. When no fault is detected in the system, the
activation signal is zero. On the other hand, when a fault is detected, then an activation
signal is sent to the FIE block.

The third block is the fault isolation block. An in depth view of this block is shown in
Fig. 8. In the case of a no-fault condition, this subsystem is not activated at all. However,
if a fault has been detected by the fault detection estimation subsystem, the FIE block is
triggered. Since four different faults are being considered, this block consists of four
further subsystems. Each subsystem represents the FIE designed for a particular fault
structure.

Since the output residual that is generated, is represented as three different components,
each FIE (designed for a particular fault structure) is required to generate three
thresholds, corresponding to each of the output components. It is assumed that the four
fault cases being considered are suffiently different from each other in terms of the fault
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structure. Then, for a particular fault case, only one of the four FIEs will be able to
generate fault isolation residuals and their corresponding fault isolation thresholds, such
that, all the fault isolation residuals generated by the FIE will remain below their
corresponding fault isolation thresholds. Then, it can be concluded that the fault structure
of that particular FIE matches the fault structure of the actual fault that has occurred and
hence the fault can be identified.

Figure 8: The block diagram of the Fault Isolation block
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7.

Simulation Results

Once a fault has been introduced into the system, the FDE block has to detect the fault. It
is assumed that only one type of fault occurs in the system at any given time. The FDE
block generates an estimated output, which is compared with the actual output. The
difference between the actual output and the estimated output is termed as a residual.
As the output signal, the residual signal also has three components. Based on the design
of the FDE, the FDE block also generates a threshold for each of these residual
components. The fault detection happens when any one of the output residual
components generated by an FDE exceeds its corresponding threshold generated by the
FDE.
Once a fault has been detected in the fault detection block, the fault type is to be
identified and isolated in the fault isolation block. Each FIE estimates the output which is
compared to the actual output to generate a residual that has three components. Similarly,
each FIE also generates three thresholds, each for one residual component. A fault is said
to be isolated, if the following conditions are satisfied


If all of the output residual components generated by an FIE, whose fault structure
matches the fault structure of the actual fault, do not exceed the thresholds
generated.



When the at least one of output residual components exceed their corresponding
thresholds generated by each of the mismatched FIEs.

Below, we give the simulation results for the simulink model of the FDI algorithm for
the single-link robotic arm that has been taken as the example.
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7.1 Sensor fault in 𝒚𝟐
The Fig. 9 shows the simulation results when there is a bias of 𝜃1 = 0.18 radians in the
sensor measuring 𝑦2 at 𝑇0 = 5sec. The top left plot, shows the simulation result of the
FDE, where the output residual component 𝑦3 (the solid line) and its corresponding
threshold (the dashed line) generated by the FDE are shown. The fault is detected at
approximately 𝑇𝑑 = 5.084sec. This detection can be seen when the output residual
component 𝑦3 (solid line) crosses the threshold (dashed line).

Figure 9: Sensor fault in 𝒚𝟐 : The plots of the FDE and the FIEs for the remaining
fault cases (sensor fault #2, process fault #1 and process fault #2) with the chosen
residual component (solid line) and its corresponding threshold (dotted line)
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At the moment of detection, the four fault isolation estimators are activated. The other
three plots show the output residual component 𝑦3 and the corresponding threshold
generated by the FIE #2, FIE #3 and FIE #4. It can be observed from Fig. 10 above, that
in FIE #2, FIE #3 and FIE #4, the residual component 𝑦3 (solid line) exceeds its threshold
(dashed line). Therefore, it can be concluded, that the fault structures, on which each of
these FIEs are modeled, do not match the fault structure of the fault that has occurred in
the system. So, the fault that has occurred is not the fault case 2, fault case 3 or fault case
4.

Figure 10: Sensor fault in 𝒚𝟐 : The plots of the FIE for the sensor fault #1, with the
three residual components (solid line) and their corresponding thresholds (dotted
line)
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The Fig. 10 shows the fault isolation estimator for sensor fault #1. It can be observed, that
all of the residual components generated by the FIE #1 do not exceed their corresponding
thresholds. Therefore, from the simulation results shown in Fig. 9 and Fig.10, it can be
concluded that the fault that has occurred in the system is fault case 1, which is a sensor
fault in the output component 𝑦2 .

Figure 11: The case of sensor fault in 𝒚𝟐 (sensor fault #1): the fault magnitude
estimation for fault isolation estimator #1.

The Fig. 11 shows the fault magnitude estimation of the fault isolation estimator (FIE)
#1. It can be seen that the value of the estimated fault magnitude is very close to the
actual sensor bias magnitude of 0.18 radians. This information can be used to conduct
fault-tolerant control, hence improving the control performance in the presence of the
fault.
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7.2 Sensor fault in 𝒚𝟑
The Fig. 12 shows the simulation results when there is a bias of 𝜃2 = 0.15 radians in the
sensor measuring 𝑦2 at 𝑇0 = 5sec. The top left plot shows the simulation result of the
FDE, where the output residual component 𝑦2 (solid line) and its corresponding threshold
(dashed line) generated by the FDE are shown. The fault is detected at approximately
𝑇𝑑 = 5.36sec. This detection can be seen when the output residual component 𝑦2 (solid
line) exceeds its threshold (dashed line) generated by the FDE.

Figure 12: Sensor fault in 𝒚𝟑 : The plots of the FDE and the FIEs for the remaining
fault cases (sensor fault #1, process fault #1 and process fault #2) with the chosen
residual (solid line) and its corresponding threshold (dotted line)
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The other three plots show the output residual component 𝑦2 and the corresponding
threshold generated by the FIE #1, FIE #3 and FIE #4. It can be observed from Fig. 13
above, that in FIE #2, FIE #3 and FIE #4, the residual component 𝑦2 (solid line) exceeds
its threshold (dashed line). Therefore, it can be concluded, that the fault structures, on
which each of these FIEs are modeled, do not match the fault structure of the fault that
has occurred in the system. So, the fault that has occurred is not the fault case 1, fault
case 3 or fault case 4.

Figure 13: Sensor fault in 𝒚𝟑 : The plots of the FIE for the sensor fault #2, with the
three residual components (solid lines) and their corresponding thresholds (dotted
lines)

Fig. 13 shows the fault isolation estimator for sensor fault #2. It can be observed, that all
of the residual components (solid lines) generated by the FIE #2 do not exceed their
45

corresponding thresholds (dashed lines). Therefore, from the simulation results shown in
Fig. 12 and Fig. 13, it can be concluded that the fault that has occurred in the system is
fault case 2, which is a sensor fault in the output component 𝑦3 .

Figure 14: The case of sensor fault in 𝒚𝟑 (sensor fault #2): the fault magnitude
estimation for fault isolation estimator #2.

Fig. 14 shows the fault magnitude estimation of the fault isolation estimator (FIE) #2. It
can be seen that the value of the estimated fault magnitude is very close to the actual
sensor bias magnitude of 0.15 radians. This information can be used to conduct faulttolerant control, to enhance the performance of the controller in the presence of the fault.
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7.3 Actuator fault
Fig. 15 shows the simulation results when there is an actuator fault with a fault magnitude
of 𝜗1 = -0.6 in 𝑦2 at 𝑇0 = 5sec. The top left plot shows the simulation result of the FDE,
where the output residual component 𝑦3 (solid line) and its corresponding threshold
(dashed line) generated by the FDE are shown. The fault is detected at approximately
𝑇𝑑 = 5.015sec.

Figure 15: Actuator fault in 𝒚𝟑 : The plots of the FDE and the FIEs for the
remaining fault cases (sensor fault #1, sensor fault #2 and process fault #2) with the
chosen residual (solid line) and its corresponding threshold (dotted line)

The other three plots also show the output residual component 𝑦3 (solid line) and the
corresponding threshold (dashed line) generated by the FIE #1, FIE #2 and FIE #4.
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Similar to the first two cases, the residual component 𝑦3 exceeds its threshold in FIE #1,
FIE #2 and FIE #4. So, the fault that has occurred is not the fault case 1, 2 or 4.

Figure 16: Actuator fault in 𝒚𝟑 : The plots of the FIE for the process fault #1, with
the three residual components (solid lines) and their corresponding thresholds
(dotted lines)

The Fig. 16 shows the fault isolation estimator for process fault #1. It can be observed,
that all of the residual components (solid lines) generated by the FIE #3 do not exceed
their corresponding thresholds (dashed lines). Therefore, from Fig. 15 and Fig. 16, it can
be concluded that the fault structure on which the FIE is modeled, matches the fault
structure of the fault, that has occurred in the system and the fault that has occurred is the
process fault case 1, which is the actuator fault.
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Figure 17: The case actuator fault in 𝒚𝟑 (process fault #1): the fault magnitude
estimation for fault isolation estimator #1.

The Fig. 17 shows the fault magnitude estimation of the fault isolation estimator (FIE)
#3. It can be seen that the value of the estimated fault magnitude is very close to the
actual fault magnitude of -0.6. This information can be used to conduct fault-tolerant
control, hence improving the control performance in the presence of the fault.

7.4 Fault leading to extra abnormal friction in the motor
The Fig. 18 shows the simulation results the fault case occurs and the viscous friction
constant 𝐹𝑚 increases from 1 Nm/V to 3.3 Nm/V. The significance of the extra friction is
given by the parameter 𝜗2 . The value of the parameter is 𝜗2 = -0.7 at 𝑇0 = 5sec. The top
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left plot shows the simulation result of the FDE, where the output residual component 𝑦3
(solid line) and its corresponding threshold (dashed line) generated by the FDE are
shown. The fault is detected at approximately 𝑇𝑑 = 5.34sec.

Figure 18: Process fault #2 in 𝒚𝟑 : The plots of the FDE and the FIEs for the
remaining fault cases (sensor fault #1, sensor fault #2 and process fault #1) with the
chosen residual (solid line) and its corresponding threshold (dotted line)

Once again, it can be observed, that in three of these fault isolation estimators, at least
one of the residual components (solid line) generated by them exceeds its corresponding
threshold (dashed line). Hence, it can be concluded, that the fault structure, on which
each of these FIEs are modeled, do not match the fault structure of the fault that has
occurred in the system.
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Figure 19: Process fault #2 in 𝒚𝟑 : The plots of the FIE for the process fault #2, with
the three residual components (solid lines) and their corresponding thresholds
(dotted lines)

The Fig. 19 shows the fault isolation estimator for process fault #2. It can be observed,
that the residual components generated by the FIE do not exceed their corresponding
thresholds.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the fault structure on which the FIE is modeled,
matches the fault structure of the fault, that has occurred in the system. The fault structure
of FIE #4 corresponds to a fault leading to extra abnormal friction in the motor.
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Figure 20: The case of fault leading to extra abnormal friction in the motor (process
fault #2): the fault magnitude estimation for fault isolation estimator #4.

The Fig. 20 shows the fault magnitude estimation of the fault isolation estimator (FIE)
#4. It can be seen that the value of the estimated fault magnitude is very close to the
actual fault magnitude of -0.7. This information can be used to conduct fault-tolerant
control, hence improving the control performance in the presence of the fault.
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8.

Conclusions and Future work

In this thesis, we developed a unified method for detecting and isolating process faults
and sensor faults in a class of nonlinear uncertain systems under consideration. More
specifically, the following contributions are made
1. A unified framework for the diagnosis of sensor faults and process faults for the
class of nonlinear systems under consideration is developed.
2. The FDI method so developed is applied to the example of the single-link robotic
arm and the fault detection and isolation design is conducted.
3. The Simulink model for the FDI algorithm of the single-link robotic arm is
implemented and satisfactory results are obtained for the various cases of fault
conditions.

Some of the topics which can be researched in the future include the following –
The algorithm presented in this thesis only deals with the fault detection and isolation of
the various fault cases, but not the fault tolerant control problem. However, fault tolerant
control is equally important as the process of fault diagnosis itself. The fault information
obtained from the FDI algorithm can be used to ensure that the corresponding fault
tolerant control algorithm can be improved. Therefore, the integration of the FDI
algorithm along with fault tolerant control is an interesting topic of research.

53

In this thesis, the only uncertainty considered in the nonlinear system, is the modeling
uncertainty. It is assumed that there is no sensor noise affecting the output of the system.
However, in practical cases, there is a possibility of the output of the sensors being
affected by a small magnitude of sensor noise. Therefore, sensor noise is another factor
that is to be considered along with modeling uncertainty, while designing the FDI
algorithm.
One of the main areas where fault diagnosis is very important is in the area of large scale
distributed networks, such as, in large scale power systems, wireless communication
systems, intelligent vehicle systems, etc. Most of the FDI algorithms that have been
developed so far have been developed for centralized systems. However, these
centralized methods cannot be applied in the case of distributed networks, due to the
constraints of computational limitations, communication bandwidth and the inherent
complexity of the system. Therefore, the development of an FDI algorithm, for such large
scale systems is an interesting topic for future research.
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